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Political climates are undoubtedly changing across the nation and creating volatile 
fluctuations of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.  In a more entertaining season of 
presidential primaries, both parties – Democratic and Republican – have nominees that 
will once again be scrutinized by many across the country.  I argue the levels of scrutiny 
will more likely than not be enhanced to new proportions.  Since a consistent reliance on 
media involvement and attack ads have grown immensely amongst presidential 
candidates, this will translate into a wider gap in party polarization and subsequently tie 
into the trust of American citizens.  Previous scholars have shown consistent data that 
political trust has no bearing on the actual turnout of presidential elections (Citrin 1974).  
But, historic distrustful ratings between major-party candidates may prove to alter 
political cultures for subsequent years.  In this study, I thoroughly examine the growing 
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Previous scholarly research has shown political trust to carry inconsistent patterns 
in determining a correlation to voter turnout.  Aside from voter turnout, there is also a 
variation in whom – if any – benefits from a lack of [or surplus in] political trust.  
Hetherington (1998) finds that a manifestation of dissatisfaction begin at the roots of an 
American populous having low political trust.  Further research brings to light low levels 
of political trust not only cause higher dissatisfaction percentages, but also leads to a 
volatile political environment (Hetherington 1998).  In such an environment, 
Hetherington (1998) concludes this climate to be more difficult than not for elected 
officials to succeed. 
So what do we infer about a political environment that includes a presidential 
candidate outside of the two-party dominated system in America?  Historically, 
Democrats and Republicans have had little worry [if any at all] about third-party 
independents running in a general election.  A potential exception is the 1992 Presidential 
Election between Incumbent George H.W. Bush [R], Bill Clinton [D], and Ross Perot [I].  
Despite not picking up any electoral votes, Perot [I] was still able to carry almost twenty-
million votes which made up roughly 19% of the electorate turnout.  This has been a 
 
2 
topic of heavy debate for scholars who focus on political trust and presidential voting 
patterns.   
While some believe the victory for Bill Clinton [D] was inevitable – based on 
President George H.W. Bush’s promise to America of “No New Taxes” and subsequent 
lack of trust based on economic adversity in the country – others seem to foster the idea 
that Perot’s candidacy as an ‘alternative option to major party politics’ is statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, Hetherington (1999) shows that incumbent presidents suffer the 
most when there is a decline of political trust in America.  Consistent with his previous 
studies, Hetherington (1999) continues the analyses by breaking down the meaning of the 
electoral context in terms of two-candidate races and three-candidate races.  Main 
findings illustrate that the politically distrustful voters tend to support candidates from the 
non-incumbent party in a two-party race, and tend to support third-party candidates 
[Independents] in a three-party race (Hetherington 1999).  In an increasing volatile 
political environment, one would be led to also expect future increases in three-party 
candidate vote percentages that are consistent with these findings.    
Many Americans throughout the country look to our leaders not only for a sense 
of direction, but surely to govern effectively despite our harsh criticisms.  The manner in 
which we carry out the process of evaluation is often in elementary form rather than a 
thorough unbiased process.  Citrin (1974) believes this is an area of concern for future 
scholars in determining the significance of cynical attitudes at the micro and macro 
levels.  He accepts previous scholarly findings in that political cynicism does have a 
relationship to the meaning of political trust, but not at the expense of donning a direct 
correlation.  Citrin (1974) continues by providing insight on the separation of ‘political 
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trust in government’ and ‘political trust in a regime.’  This perspective allows a closer 
look at the organic body of an institution and also the current incumbent’s party within 
the presidency more accurately. 
Most scholars agree that political trust can generally become divided into 
numerous subsections as long as the topics remain consistent in producing an accurate 
reflection of the people.  A more prominent definition of political trust is attainable by 
seeking the numerous attributes that generally makeup one’s trust percentage.  Typically, 
this is where one determines how well government officials represent the people, whether 
government officials are viewed as crooked, whether government officials waste 
economic funding, whether public policy reflects the demands of the people, and a base 
question of whether one trusts the government or not.  Conducted at the University of 
Michigan, this survey research has been essential in providing subsequent time-series 
analyses.  It also allows a more thorough and accurate understanding of the electorate in 
attempting to quantify the importance of issues across history.  Responses are in ordinal 
level data where scholars can subsequently utilize methods in interpreting future data 
sets, tables, and charts.  One would expect much more accuracy and removals of 
subjective biases in this quantitative data as compared to the qualitative approach – face 
to face accumulation.  Remaining consistent with the research, the most prominent 
definition of political trust is made up of people’s evaluations of the government, how 
well they are going about their job, with a direct comparison to how the people feel their 
performance level should be at.  Appendix A includes a better synopsis of the 
questionnaire provided by the American National Election Studies.  
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In a perfect world, there would be much more simplicity to determining exact 
levels of political trust.  Utilizing interval level data measurements would then alter the 
ability for scholars to examine the effects of different factors on one’s psyche in 
determining the significance of trust.  Here, one would be able to see the distance 
between pivot points and further hypothesize the relationships of measurement for 
correlation and causation.  Since there is no ‘absolute zero’ in political trust, one must 
also account for outside factors that effect this relationship.  One must also account for 
the outside factors that continuously take place on Capitol Hill as well.  Gridlock, known 
as the persistent inability to enact major legislation, can create heavier distrust between 
the people and government leaders (LeLoup and Shull 2003).  Further studies display 
rather intriguing findings from a historical context. 
Economics 
Economics carry an effect, directly or indirectly, to all American citizens as it 
pertains to job opportunities, public policies, and yes, politics.  Whether we see this, or 
not, remains a question of one’s initiative in self-interests or the beneficial interest of all 
to some degree.  This becomes an interesting component of political trust in determining 
the significance that citizens will trust government, not trust government, or hold an 
indifferent position based on the state of the economy within the country.  In fact, some 
of the researched effects pertaining to economic performance on political trust have been 
drawn to the conclusion of being unbalanced and asymmetric of sorts (Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2008).  
Since economics and income are relevant to the purchasing of goods and 
sustaining a livelihood, this is an issue that remains consistent at any point in time 
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throughout history.  We, as Americans, tend to take certain liberties and rights for granted 
at times.  More specifically, when economic times are good, we are less inclined to give 
credit to the government.  Counter to that position, when economic times are adverse, we 
are more likely to take away credit from the government and also blame them for our 
shortcomings (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008).  When the people evaluate government, 
much can be derived from the public attention given on issues that saliently dominate 
conversations.  
A prior study by Hetherington (1998) remains consistent with the research 
outlined above with a more concrete example in modern political times.  Notably, 
economic evaluations by the people had a dramatic effect on political trust during the 
1988 Presidential Election between George H.W. Bush [R] and Michael Dukakis [D] 
when the economy was in a favorably-based [more positive than negative] environment.  
A potential explanation for the incumbent’s party carrying this election is indeed the 
popularity of former President Reagan, his ability to forecast George H.W. Bush as the 
obvious choice, and the subsequent inclination of one to believe much economic 
prosperity would mirror that of the Reagan years in office.  But, during the 1996 
Presidential Election between Incumbent Bill Clinton [D] and Bob Dole [R] when the 
economic environment was good, there was no effect.  The presence of Ross Perot [I] 
may have also contributed to such results; albeit, the quantification of significance may 
prove to be minute of sorts.  Interestingly, backing up the work of Hetherington (1998), 
Citrin and Green (1986) find similar patterns.   
In 1980, economic issues were more salient and had an effect on political trust 
levels in government by the people.  During this slow, stationary economic environment, 
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the political environment was suffering for Incumbent Jimmy Carter [D].  Challenger 
Ronald Reagan [R] was better able to identify with the American people and provide a 
message of hope and strength in numbers.  As such, the American people sought a 
change since much of the blame went towards the Carter Administration for their poor 
economic times.  Thus, further illustrating the significant effect that poor economics led 
to much lower levels of political trust during a time of adversity, Americans tend to care 
more about times being bad as opposed to being good.  
When economic times returned to a much stronger position in 1984, once again 
the levels of concerns amongst the American people were lowered.  When this took 
place, the economic evaluations had no effect on political trust levels (Citrin and Green 
1986).   
The underlying rationale suggests that each individual will have a different 
propensity to respond in ways that differ based on economic threats.  Economic issues 
tend to be more home-grown and are less likely to pose a threat to the political system as 
opposed to international affairs (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008).  Some scholars even 
question the levels of political trust having an effect on the distribution of funding to 
social programs in the United States.  Put another way, lowering political trust may 
indeed provide an advantage for an opposing party in the White House as well as 
Congress.  And, if this were to occur, conclusions would show political trust to have a 
significant effect on political outcomes (Hetherington 2005). 
Shaffer (1982) explains more thoroughly the complexity behind economic issues 
as it pertains to different levels of socioeconomic status, race, and geographic areas 
within the country.  The cross-tabulation ran ensures the prevention of further 
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methodically artefactual conclusions and more accurate data interpretations (Shaffer 
1982).    The main finding illustrates differences between each citizen throughout the 
country based on preferences of policy and prevalence of issue importance.  These 
findings also provide further backing of the constant evolution of political times and 
political environments in each area of the country.  Through utilization of a multiple 
regression equation, these results were able to avoid much of the bias that troubles 
scholars of political trust [when attempting to correlate a sense of direction in liberal, 
conservative, and moderate positions].  Even though the study shows that there are no 
ideologically consistent differences between voters and non-voters, Shaffer (1982) does 
provide data illustrating a consistency in the argument of voters being more conservative 
on economic issues until the late 1960’s.  This bias of conservatism was only partially 
because of the ‘more’ conservative orientations of higher socioeconomic statuses 
compared to those of lower socioeconomic statuses throughout the country (Shaffer 
1982).   
International Events  
International affairs, phenomena, and disasters are an intriguing subunit of 
political trust because more often than not these events are impossible to foresee.  On 
many occasions, international crises can create an initial ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect that 
boosts the political trust levels of the American public in political leaders (Berinsky 
2009) (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).  During a period of higher political trust, it’s 
important to note this also manifests into higher levels of public support.  With the higher 
levels of public support, leaders in government are better able to make changes on the 
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battlefield, changing the conduct of the conflict, and potentially bringing forth a better 
outcome (Mueller 1973).   
Mueller (1973) examined three important groups – followers, partisans, and 
believers - when conceptualizing the different types of public support towards a 
presidential leader.  First, followers are more inclined to take the position of the nation’s 
leadership – especially the president.  Second, partisans are people who go on the 
position of their own party’s leadership and position themselves accordingly.  Lastly, 
believers focus on the issue while utilizing one’s own ideology, methodical view on 
foreign policy, and/or self-interest (Mueller 1973).  By separating the groups with 
different identifiers, Muller (1973) was also able to indirectly distinguish between the 
fluctuating educated and uneducated respondents in the American public sample.  
Accounting for the overall disinterest by most Americans in politics, Mueller 
(1973) conducted interviews and kept his unit of analysis on ‘households’ rather than 
people.  This helps to proportionally represent those who are able to vote.  Questions 
were also methodically calculated to be more simple in wording; thus, avoiding the 
potential to load a question in one direction or the other.  Over a period of time with 
utilization of a trend analysis, Mueller (1973) allows future scholars to see shifts and 
views change.   
Overall, Mueller (1973) confirms the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ phenomena did have a 
statistically significant effect on the presidential popularity levels.  But, this is very much 
a more short-lived boost in popularity rather than a sustainment.  After a certain period of 
time, the American opinion and behavior towards an international crisis can eventually 
shift course.  Numbers in deaths, economic spending [tax hikes], prolonged media 
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coverage, and the geographic proximity to ‘home’ can quickly turn a positive public 
support position into a negative support position.  Undoubtedly, presidents must take into 
account the views of their electorate to some degree in seeking to sustain popularity 
levels that are deemed acceptable by the public.  Certainly, this is more easily said than 
accomplished with a constant fluctuation in political subcultures and climates from a 
national perspective.   
Political Corruption and Fairness Concerns  
Political scandal and a sense of corruption can not only increase the likelihood of 
a president losing a seat in office, but it can create long-lasting effects on an American 
public that already has minimal interests in the political sector (Rose-Ackerman 1999).  
This is directly related to the self-interest and public interest conflict, and under normal 
conditions, create concerns amongst the populous.  When concerns are heightened, public 
policy tends to be preferred that is beneficial towards one’s own interest [solely] rather 
than a collective effort.  When concerns are lowered, the counter happens, and public 
policy tends to be preferred that is beneficial towards the interest of all (Stone 2002).  
The concerns of citizens may prove to be an indicator that government is not effectively 
managing their job, and the appearance of corruption does not help in the slightest.   
The appeal of a candidate is heightened when there is consistency in the policy 
and ritualistic approach during advertising a brand and debate (Ginsberg and Stone 
1996).  In a nation-wide sample approach, Katz and Warshel (2001) find that the ability 
for a presidential candidate to maintain visibility and a sense of transparency help allow 
more people to build a potential sense of trust and coalition of support around.  Still, there 
are a number of issues that lead to scrutiny and basic theorization about a person and 
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society about how to actually win an election beyond these measures (Katz and Warshel 
2001).  Once again, one can see that a national perspective on politics is not an easy task 
to accomplish with a plethora of concurring or dissenting views.  But, avoiding 
corruption is surely a firm beginning.   
History provides a few concrete examples of how presidential elections can 
quickly become controversial based on the outcomes.  For example, based on the 2000 
Presidential Election between George W. Bush [R] and Al Gore [D], we see a clearly 
controversial election that was extremely close.  President elect, George W. Bush, 
actually won the presidency based on the Electoral College despite not receiving more 
votes than Al Gore.  Let alone the controversy behind a recount taking place in Florida, 
media networks went back and forth on who was actually leading or going to win the 
presidency.  Confusion soon took place thereafter in the days to come that ultimately led 
to the Supreme Court’s involvement that determined the final say in the 2000 presidential 
election (Gillman 2002).   
In a subsequent study to the perceived electoral fairness of George W. Bush in 
2000, Craig, Martinez, Gainous, and Kane (2006) conducted a legitimization experiment 
amongst the winners and losers of the election.  Utilizing a selected number of datasets 
from the National Election Study surveys [1964-2004], their research was able to 
examine a time period of forty years.  Consistent with previous data and research, their 
findings help provide support that show those who voted for the loser in a presidential 
election will perceive the election as unfair.  Also, along with the unfairness of the 
election, supporters of losing candidates will be more dissatisfied with the state of 
democracy.  Supporters of losing candidates will exhibit much lower levels of political 
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trust than those who supported the winning candidate of the presidential election (Craig, 
Martinez, et al. 2006) (Anderson and LoTempio 2002).  Meanwhile, those who supported 
the winner of a presidential election are more inclined to view the election as fair and be 
satisfied with the state of democracy.   
Confidence in government was also found to be an issue amongst those who 
supported a losing candidate as opposed to a winning candidate in the 2000 presidential 
election (Craig, Martinez, et al. 2006).  During a lack of confidence, those who display 
this characteristic are more likely than not to rationalize legitimacy issues with the nature 
of the ruling bodies in which presidents are elected into office.  The supporters of losing 
candidates are also more inclined to mention a lack of ‘options’ offered in the election, or 
choice of candidates.  Overall, the interpretations of voters show the relationship between 
being on a side of victory as opposed to a side of defeat.   
The more controversial an election also raises the propensity and likelihood of 
rationalizations, political distrust, and questions about government legitimacy in future 
elections to come.  The attitudes of the electorate coupled along with interpretation of 
electoral fairness, serves as an indicator between behavior tendencies of political support 
and candidate preferences (Craig, Martinez, et al. 2006).  Elections are supposed to 
provide the people with a sense of belonging, making a difference, and obviously a 
legitimate blueprint for those representing our interests.  Political cynicism can then 
manifest through the suggestions of losing candidates, their supporters, and the 
mainstream media.  A similar study by Avery (2007) on the 2000 presidential election 
confirms the views of losing candidates.  Findings further illustrate that blacks in 
particular perceived the Supreme Court’s decision on Bush v. Gore (2000) to be 
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illegitimate; therefore, continuing a lack of political trust (Avery 2007).  Certainly, one 
does not have to go far back in history to view another presidential election as 
controversial and historic, simultaneously.   
Consistent with the findings of Craig, Martines, Gainous, and Kane (2006), 
Nunnally (2011) also finds there are voting irregularities amongst voters who express 
political distrust.  The 2008 presidential election between Barack Obama [D] and John 
McCain [R] was both historical and highly publicized.  For the first time in history, 
African Americans watched along as a pragmatic black candidate was able to win over 
the hearts of citizens throughout the country.  Despite being an underdog, Obama 
delivered on the highest of stages during the primary season in defeating favorite, Hillary 
Clinton [D].  His eloquent speaking, tactical debate approach, and message of hope 
provided many with the opportunity of voting outside the Clinton and Bush dynasties that 
dominated the previous two decades.    
Obama was also a candidate that many felt would better proportionally represent 
the Democratic Party substantively since almost 90% of blacks identify as Democrat 
voters (Nunnally 2011).  The core issue was to overcome the idea of voter dilution that 
plagued the political trust levels of numerous blacks and other minorities.  This is 
statistically significant since whites are already more likely to vote than blacks – 
especially the older, more affluent, and better educated.  The results of having voter 
dilution carried out for so many years which oppressed blacks’ right to vote is something 
future research should surely seek and attempt to quantify.  Yet, despite the political 
oppression for many generations, Nunnally (2011) finds that there were no racial 
differences in how registered voters fear or do not fear voting irregularities.  
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Since race is a non-factor in determining the fear of voting irregularities, one must 
now look towards what makes up the blueprint of such.  Nunnally (2011) also finds more 
to the point data, that being, all citizens – regardless of race – process information in a 
similar fashion.  The availability of this information is what separates one’s ability to 
further process an educated opinion and view on a particular issue.  Cable television, 
social media, and other modern technology device access leads to a higher propensity of 
one not only being able to form an opinion, but also become active in the political sector.  
More likely than not, this is where higher socioeconomic statuses help provide access to 
these tools; thus, providing an individual the necessary means of achieving an end-goal of 
having a political voice and avoiding the likelihood of displaying fear of voting 
irregularities. 
Media Bias and Party Polarization  
 The media, much like any other institution or business organization, has its own 
agenda set with goals to achieve throughout the course of an annual year.  Political 
climates, subcultures, fiscal economics, international affairs, and other mainstream news 
are observed to maintain relevance in modern times.  Looking at the media in terms of a 
market, the apparent goal is to not only maintain what you already have [viewers], but to 
also branch out and attract new viewers within that same ideological framework that does 
not compromise the satisfaction of what’s already there in place.  It’s not foreign to note 
the discrepancies in delivery of the ‘news’ from one network to the other.  Ipso facto, 
mainstream media networks deliver what they want you to see and hear.   
 Surprisingly, newspapers are more bias leaning than television networks, and this 
strong sense of partisanship attracts those individuals who are stronger party advocates, 
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Democrats or Republicans (Shaffer 1981).  The strength of one’s political ideology and 
efficacy level also translates to the very nature of politics - who gets what, when and 
where.  The ability for one to discern certain elements of media bias and formulate an 
opinion based on factual evidence is truly at the heart of democracy.  This is 
counterintuitive in American political cultures since there is already the issue of a 
prevalent [and growing] disinterest in politics.  Question remaining, can we trust 
televised media to have a positive effect on our political efficacy levels while merely 
seeking to lower the sense of political distrust in the country? 
 In a study presenting the exposure of televised political disagreements having an 
effect on the American public’s social norm of constructive debate, Mutz and Reeves 
(2005) provide an intriguing outlook on this phenomena.  Concerned with the quality of 
political debate and the leaders, Mutz and Reeves (2005) raise light to the concerns that 
many Americans may have throughout the country when viewing politics – whether they 
can trust the government or not.  Once again, the research focuses on the civility, 
incivility, and embodiments of government leaders and the way the people perceive them 
to be.  The main focus - showing whether or not televised incivility has an effect on the 
evaluative methods of the people on candidates – further provide a direction of the 
importance in one’s personality characteristics during the debate process.  To account for 
an authentic view and to produce stimuli for the study, professional actors were hired to 
play the roles of candidates and a moderator relaying the questions accordingly. 
 Detrimental effects occur when uncivil political debate and discourse are shown 
to viewers that statistically relate to their political trust levels.  Along with the attitudes 
being affected, but also the levels of support for the institutions and government together 
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were lowered in numbers (Mutz and Reeves 2005).  The more attacking, outrageous 
based commentary, and enhanced perception of arguing had a negative effect on the view 
of a candidate.  The general manner in which these disagreements took place strongly 
suggests that people do care about the presidential character of candidates.  Consistent 
with previous research, Mutz and Reeves (2005) do show political trust levels to be much 
higher during the course of civil debate as opposed to uncivil debate. 
 It’s well worth mentioning that this study also provided rather fascinating results 
pertaining to the level of interest in politics.  As we know, and have previously stated, 
Americans are already extremely disinterested in politics.  But, this study shows that 
respondents were much more likely to become engaged in politics when the content of 
debate was uncivil as opposed to civil.  Despite not trusting the candidates that displayed 
uncivil behavior, statistically speaking, candidates were much more likely to be viewed 
as entertaining.  This entertainment theoretically translates to not only much more interest 
in the political sector, but also to political cynicism in a fashion that keeps one in politics 
by utilizing unorthodox measures.   
 For most, politics all in its own does not generate enough merit to sufficiently 
compete with the entertainment of other mainstream shows on television networks (Mutz 
and Reeves 2005).  Future theoretical implications may show more candidates in modern 
times – such as Donald Trump [R] – to adopt a new methodology in rallying the people 
with high-energy political uncivility.  The expense of uncivility as opposed to civility is 
highly debatable in determining the actual likelihood of becoming elected.  What we are 
unable to discredit are the empirical facts that individuals are driven by the entertainment 
involved in mainstream media networks and the potential belief amongst those of being 
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correct based on the information relayed by producers. Highly passionate and stubborn 
separation of views in the electorate is what creates a growing gap, otherwise known as 
‘party polarization.’ 
 Party polarization continues to separate not only the constituencies across the 
country, but also elected government officials in their decision making from politics to 
public policy.  What all seek is an outcome where the quality or ‘product’ of government 
is enhanced to better proportions on a daily basis.  Partiality to one’s party and ideology 
makes this an extremely difficult task to accomplish.  Let alone the wants and agenda of 
one’s party, lobbyists and donors are sure to be heard in the decision-making process 
through their contributions to campaigns.  Super PACs, a major factor in elections 
through massive contributions that on many occasions is exempt from specific donor 
identification information, more than likely add to a growing party polarization (Herrnson 
2016).    
 The ideas of political participation along with roles citizens have in electoral 
processes must be rethought in order to make government more responsible, and 
potentially restore some element of trust we have in the institution (Clifford 2013).  Until 
this takes place, ‘quality’ of government, based on public policies and institutions, will 
unable to be solved in a realistic and human effort (Rothstein 2011).  An argument 
provided by Rothstein (2011) illustrates the moral basis as a blueprint for construction of 
policies that all individuals, interests groups, and parties can back to some degree.  
Statistically significant research findings with a p-value of (<0.001) further shows when 
authorities ‘help people,’ then they are much more likely to be viewed as trustable.  Since 
Democrats are more inclined to provide economic support for those of lower income 
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levels and minorities, this poses an advantage of sorts in the electorate’s view of 
polarization between the two major parties. 
 Political parties do contribute a great deal in American politics on a national level 
and they tend to advocate different policies and ideologies through the course of their 
relationships with one another in Washington D.C. between congressional and 
presidential offices (Mayhew 2005).  Consistent with President Woodrow Wilson’s 
curiosity of a successful government being possible with divided party control between 
branches, Mayhew (2005) sought to better explain whether this was possible when party 
polarization is prevalent, especially between the president and congress.  Since 
congressional oversight and much more heated debates are to take place under a divided 
government, Mayhew accounted for this factor by developing a control variable of 
‘unified’ government.  The results were rather shocking to note that despite unified or 
divided control of government; ‘major’ enactments did not suffer in the policy-making 
process.  Instead, the control variable of ‘unified’ government provided an unstable 
coefficient that was counter to the original research hypothesis; thus, concluding the 
inability to reject the null hypothesis.  
 When non-statistically significant relationships are concluded, this tends to draw 
upon more theories and debate amongst scholars to combat the growing gap.  For 
example, looking at phenomena that effect American democracy more directly – I.e. 
expansion of the vote, modernizing voter registration methods, and moving the day of the 
election – are some ideas that Mann and Ornstein (2012) develop.  Obviously, this would 
be done through reconstruction of the US Constitution in some elements, but worth 
noting due to an electorate that majority wise prefers term-limits amongst congressional 
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leaders.  As previously mentioned by scholars, voters must act ‘strategically’ and reward 
leaders with problem solving skills and punish those who obstruct the process of policy-
making (Mann and Ornstein 2012).  Congress, not having the glamour or prestige of the 
presidency, is more often than not viewed as the problem when government comes to a 
standstill and bipartisan work is not conducted (Binder 1999).  
 The source of legislative gridlock and the subsequent effect it has on the 
American public is often obscure.  In an effort to better develop answers rather than 
uncertainty, Bowling and Ferguson (2001) sought to better correlate the relationships 
between interest representations and divided government on gridlock.  Their findings are 
consistent with previous data – divided government all by itself does not prevent the 
production of major policy – but the breakdown is further extrapolated in measures 
beyond branch to branch relations.  When executives were faced with opposition from a 
legislature, there were more tendencies to have prolonged debate and make governing 
more difficult for the executive.  But, when there was a division between the inter-
chamber relations of a legislature, there was a positive [non-significant] relationship 
which did not lead to more difficulties for an executive to govern (Bowling and Ferguson 
2001).  These findings illustrate that despite differences between parties, bi-partisan work 
can produce quality policies with an effort on the ideal of helping the people.  Bowling 
and Ferguson (2001) also state the significant importance of always accounting for the 
positioning and influence of interest groups in the political sector.  A challenge is to 





Inactive Voters and Active Voters 
 Inactive voters are individuals who are registered to vote, and able to vote, but 
choose not to do so (Verba and Nie 1987).  Typically, in order to keep up with national 
voter rolls and data, an individual is deemed ‘inactive’ after missing two consecutive 
federal elections.  Voting precincts and county registrars seek to minimize this group of 
the populous by updating personal information.  This is conducted by mailing out voter 
registration cards with a specific emphasis for voters to update their addresses.  If the 
postcard is not returned, an individual will remain in the statistical category of inactive 
until the update information has been obtained. 
 Active voters are those who are registered to vote, and actually make their way to 
the polls to cast a ballot (Verba and Nie 1987).  These voters are also broken down into a 
plethora of categories that have a fluctuation of political involvement beyond voting.  
Whether a voting specialist [one who votes but is not involved in any other sort of 
activism] or complete activist, active voters provide a better sense of direction in a 
democracy with their voice being heard.  
Politically Efficacious and Non-Politically Efficacious 
 Political efficacy is a belief that one can have an impact on the political arena and 
their influence can ultimately shape the decisions and methodology of others (Luskin 
1987).  Political efficacy can also be broken down into two separate units, internal and 
external political efficacy.  Internal political efficacy is focusing on the belief that an 
individual has the capacity to understand what’s going on in politics based on their own 
competence; and, external political efficacy is more focused on beliefs of the government 
and governmental leaders being responsive to the needs of citizens (Craig, Niemi and 
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Silver 1990).  Clearly, the two units are related but have different areas of belief.  
Scholars seem to differ in opinion whether or not to distinguish the two, but Craig, Nemi, 
and Silver (1990) illustrate the importance of doing such in an attempt to minimalize 
contradictory conclusions.  Despite their efforts, main findings still show their opposing 
view to carry unreliable and validity issues.  Scholars continue to seek quantification 
methods in an attempt to better define and conceptualize political efficacy in this regard.   
 Those who are non-politically efficacious do not have the belief that they are able 
to make a difference in politics.  The non-politically efficacious also have a much lower 
propensity to influence others in the political arena, if at all.  Individuals at this level of 
efficacy could be categorized as such for a multitude of reasons.  Some of these reasons 
include, but are not limited to:  age, education level completed, race, and socioeconomic 
status.  Typically, the younger generations coupled with a low-education level completed 
show minimal interest in politics and therefore are more likely than not to be non-
politically efficacious.  Also, those of lower socioeconomic statuses coupled with being a 
minority, raise the likelihood that one will also be non-politically efficacious.   
Presidential Voting 
 The presidency itself can be viewed from many different perspectives, but 
assuming this position is maintained solely would be fallible.  The executive branch 
receives most of the credit when times are good and most of the blame when times are 
bad.  By default, the president inherits much of the praise and scrutiny that comes along 
with being the commander-in-chief of the United States.  The very moment a president is 
sworn into office is also the very same moment he must determine how to utilize skill and 
other powers to work in his favor (Neustadt 1960).  Regardless of agenda, what a 
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president must seek to avoid is being representative in a manner that is conducive only to 
a select few which serve the best interests of his initiatives. 
 Communication skills and the ability to display high character can mobilize an 
entire base along with defining a presidency as a whole (Skowronek 1997).  Political 
subcultures carry different variants in time as the needs and policy concerns of an 
electorate on a national level change.  The ability for a president to obtain the trust of the 
people is vital.  Combating against economic setbacks, international fallouts, showing 
empathy for the common citizen, and not leaning too liberal or conservative are 
commonalities that successful president re-elects have shown in previous election cycles.  
The connections a president is able to make with the populous, regardless of right-wing 
or left-wing ideologists, help to create momentum prior to taking office.   
 By the time a president takes office, the public has already developed a sense of 
perception on his character and what type of leader he will actually become.  It becomes 
more-clear in years subsequent that we are better able to not only evaluate a president on 
his tenure in the oval office, but also what type of individual the president was while 
ruling the country (Barber 2009).  What we [the people] want, and what Washington D.C. 
wants, often can differ in policy and perspective.  The presidency is the only one of its 
kind that takes into account an electorate on the national level as opposed to any state or 
district within state level.  Anticipated positions on the presidency show a wanted 
representation of the people based on their ‘popular’ will (Nelson 2010).  Presumably, 
opinions and political activism levels can fluctuate depending on how much one actually 
trusts the government that may or may not be reflective of an electorate.   
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 Fascinating results, drawn from the research of Abravanel and Busch (1975), 
provide scholars with an unorthodox view of what many may have previously 
hypothesized.  Based on political competence and trust levels pertaining to voting, the 
higher politically confident individuals tend to show higher averages of political interest, 
but also show lower levels of political trust which incline them to more unconventional 
methods of political strategies (Abravanel and Busch 1975).  This translates to political 
competence not necessarily leading one to trust government, nor benefiting an incumbent 
president holding office.  Also, just as intriguing are the findings that individuals who are 
more involved in stronger party identification ties are less likely to trust government than 
those who have never been involved in partisan activity.  Question rising:  What are the 
most statistically significant indicators of lower presidential voting turnout? 
 A study conducted by Shaffer (1981) is one likely explanation of the most 
statistically significant factors that affect voter turnout.  Bivariate and multivariate 
analysis help to show results over a period of time that could have independent effects 
that are more data credible than others.  Careful question wording and systematic 
measurements can help minimize inconsistent results that may have previously 
overlooked certain phenomena credible to a study by posing similar, yet different, 
meanings (Abramson and Finifter 1981).  Dealing with the methodical concerns, political 
trust failed to portray a statistically meaningful effect in any portion of the study (Shaffer 
1981).  Even more fascinating was the sample taken from the southern voters showing 
lower political trust levels than any other portion of the country and their elevation in 
voter turnout percentages (Shaffer 1981).   
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 Political behavior on a national electorate population is more difficult to measure 
when accounting for outliers such as the ‘deviant’ south.  Although voting is a rather 
simple act, the registration [or burden of becoming registered] itself is far more of a 
barrier than simply casting a ballot.  The institutional requirement and then the act of 
actually casting a ballot are a two-tier process that takes place at different locations across 
different time frames (Timpone 1998).  Research on separating these two criteria 
provided by Timpone (1998) help add to the logic of outside factors determining whether 
one goes to the polls or not.  More unique than previous scholarly work, Timpone (1998) 
finds that political efficacy – both the internal and external levels – along with the 
strength of one’s partisanship [party identification] does not indicate whether one will be 
able to vote as much as length at residence.  Since one must first be registered to vote 
prior to casting a ballot, this brings light to adversities individuals may face when moving 
from one geographic area to the next. 
 Statistically significant results indicate the structural process and institutional 
requirements of registering to be an interesting discussion for future debate.  Maybe when 
the knowledge and passage of information age is then brought forth to a higher base, this 
will in return mobilize a national constituency even beyond the record numbers we have 
seen in recent presidential primary election contests.  Overall, voter turnout and political 
trust have still been unimpressive in numbers since the 1960 presidential election 
between John F. Kennedy [D] and Richard Nixon [R].  Taking a closer look at 
individual-level behavior and requirements by the government may indicate more 
attention towards policy such as the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.  Coming to 
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light with more determinants of political behavior and their relationship to the presidency 
as both an individual, and an institutional branch, may correlate to less political cynicism. 
 Beneficial to any president, the economic conditions are more likely to hurt 
congressional leaders than the commander-in-chief.  Surely, the president answers to the 
economy like any other politician, but the leash is much shorter for those who are already 
viewed more negatively [congressmen and congresswomen] than the president.  Also, 
since any House of Representative Member remains under a two-year term, their constant 
involvement in Washington D.C. along with their home district is under review.  The 
short-term fluctuations in voting behavior by default are much more likely to then punish 
congressional leaders during poor economic times (Kramer 1971).  Same party 
affiliations between legislative and executive branches do play a role in helping a 
president seek reelection.   
The same can be said of executive to legislative branch relations as well.  But, 
once again, a president inherits a much more ‘prestigious’ office and is more prone to 
survive poor performances by his congressional leaders than congressional leaders 
surviving poor performances by the president.  When economic times are great, both 
congressional leaders of the president’s party and the president benefit despite the 
president carrying most of the credit.  These are identified as presidential coattails and 
can attract more votes in the future for the president and his party through methodical 
campaign strategies by running well ahead of time (Kramer 1971).  
Presidents can help their own cause of obtaining votes in the future by utilizing 
their time during the ‘honeymoon’ phase effectively.  This phase is the early onset of a 
presidential term, typically in his first two years holding office where one will enjoy 
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more positive evaluations than negative evaluations.  During this phase, the populous is 
more inclined to trust the president and support his initiatives for policy.  Chanley, 
Rudolph, and Rahn (2000) illustrate this concept in a governmental experiment showing 
people who do not trust the government are also more likely to leave less positive 
evaluations and show less support for government policies.  These findings, consistent 
with Hetherington (1998) point out a correlation between political trust and public policy 
mood within the electorate.  In other words, if the public is more trusting, then the 
president will more likely than not be able to push his agenda [with the public support of 
his domestic policy stance], and generally speaking, there will be more support for the 
government (Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn 2000).   
Political evaluations of government and a president are especially influenced by 
the appearance of political scandal, economic booms, and crime control (Chanley, 
Rudolph and Rahn 2000).  These factors are shaped not only at the individual-level of 
political behavior but also on a city-to-city level that help provide a much more clear 
picture of economic inequalities, political polarization, racial differences, and populations 
(Rahn and Rudolph 2005).  Rahn and Rudolph (2005) further extrapolate the importance 
of political representation amongst different individual views in cities throughout the 
country.  The importance of race and proportional representation also seems to be a 
concern amongst citizens throughout the country as well.  With America’s growing 
diversity, one would think there is a more willing attitude to understand the ideologies of 
an opposite; albeit, debate on many occasions can become heated amongst others.  But, 
more diversity translates to the growing polarization in political ideologies which makes 
the oval office a rather difficult branch to manage. Leaders are better able to get their 
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agenda accomplished with flexibility when communities are more homogeneous across 
the country (Rahn and Rudolph 2005). 
The American public carries unique tendencies into election cycles given the 
plethora of civil liberties that are enjoyed on a daily basis.  With poor turnout percentages 
comes much debate on how, and why, this seems to occur.  In a country with a two-party 
dominated system, Americans can sometimes hold the position of not having a viable 
option to select which brings forth dissatisfaction with representation (Miller and 
Listhaug 1990).  This coupled with a lack of faith in the political system could lead to 
more individuals skipping out on Election Day.  Previous scholars have undoubtedly 
analyzed political trust to be significant or non-statistically significant through empirical 
research on the effect towards presidential voting.   
The prior research tends to focus on how negative political trust hurts presidential 
initiatives and their approval ratings all while creating a lack of faith in government at 
unique levels of relevance.  But, what if the lack of representation actually brings forth 
voter turnout by means we have never witnessed in elections past?  What if the distrustful 
voters are so passionate about one candidate [not obtaining office] that they are willing to 
vote for the opponent - despite not giving their endorsed support?  Can political distrust 
lead to an increase in presidential voter turnout percentages and subsequently create an 
advantage for Democrats or Republicans?  Remarkably unique characteristics of current 
political times and subcultures throughout the country have created a demand to 
reconsider the significance of political trust in determining the next President of the 





In order to assess the effect of political trust on the 2016 presidential vote 
selection, I utilize data from the American National Election Studies, Gallup, Pew 
Research Center, and Five-Thirty-Eight.  These outlets provide a much more specific 
illustration of particular demographics of interest that allows one to theorize the potential 
impact of political trust on the 2016 vote selection.  By comparing the data, I am better 
able to recognize and interpret political times based on different variables that may or 
may not have been as significant thru different points in history.  More specifically, I will 
investigate and examine how party identification, education levels, ‘most important 
issue,’ ideology, and age all tie into political trust levels and how this subsequently 
relates to the presidential vote selection over time.  This forecast will provide one with a 
better sense of how voters prioritize their selections based on the unique demographics in 
this unique presidential election. 
My demographics of interest include party identification, education levels, most 
important issue, ideology, and age.  By party identification, I conceptualize as the 
political party in which one most identifies.  With regards to education levels, I’m 
interested in the different ranges of highest education completed.  Most important issue is 
conceptualized as what one feels is the ‘most important’ thing government needs to 
address in government at the time.  Ideology, being straight forward, is where one aligns 
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on the political ideology scale (far left being more liberal and far right being more 
conservative).  Age, also being pretty straight forward, is the age level that one falls into 
at the time of voting selections.   
My independent variable, political trust, is conceptualized in a manner that 
remains consistent with previous scholarly research.  I focus on the views that relate to 
government being run in the best interest of all, or a select few, the levels of government 
wasting funds (tax dollars), whether or not government officials are viewed as crooked, 
and the overall trust levels that reflect views towards the federal government.  Based on 
previous scholarly work, I feel it is important to note government officials and the federal 
government as those of authority, decision makers and leaders.    To provide one with a 
better sense of illustration, I include figures in Chapter III, Data and Results.  
My dependent variable, presidential vote, is conceptualized as the presidential 
vote selection that one chooses on Election Day.  The focus here is to see whether or not 
a correlation can be drawn from political trust to presidential voting based on the 
categorical variables listed above.  I also seek to assess the effect of political trust having 
an effect on the percentages drawn towards third-party candidates, also known as the 
candidates within the Independent Party.  A focus of illustration is also imperative for 
readers to see the fluctuation in this variable as well.  For this reason, I include figures for 
this variable in Chapter III, Data and Results, too.   
Through this model, I am seeking to better provide a representative view of well-
calculated, current political views and opinions towards presidential candidates in the 
2016 General Election with a direct emphasis on the categorical variables listed above.  
In a political climate that currently remains volatile and unique of sorts from any previous 
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election, I hope to draw upon previous trends, situations, and circumstances that can 
relate some sense of similarities to what’s taking place in the 2016 General Election.  The 
feelings of voters and their range of opinions, coupled with views, more likely than not 
will determine the direction of not only this election, but subsequent elections to follow 
due to the paradigm extremes of the left-winged and right-winged candidates from the 
primaries (i.e. Bernie Sanders, Democratic ‘Socialist,’ and Donald Trump, ‘Republican 
Nationalist’).  Undoubtedly, traditional party politics may hinder the majority of voters in 
this country to not only trust government, but also create a demand for reform and 
realignment (especially within the Republican Party due to the country shifting more 
Democratic by the year).   
I hypothesize that individuals who have a party identification of Democrat will 
overwhelmingly support the Democratic Candidate, Hillary Clinton.  I couple this 
hypothesis with logistical reasoning behind the coattails of current President Barack 
Obama and party unification amongst Democrats.  Since President Obama currently 
holds office, lower levels of political distrust will be exhibited amongst Democrats 
towards Hillary Clinton.  Meanwhile, those with a party identification of Republican will 
show higher levels of political distrust in current political times and towards Democratic 
Candidate, Hillary Clinton.  Consistent with the logistical reasoning of Democrats to 
support Incumbent President Obama, and his endorsement of Hillary Clinton, 
Republicans will counter with not only high political distrust levels towards Clinton, but 
also show lower levels of political distrust towards Republican Candidate, Donald Trump 
and Independent Candidate, Gary Johnson.   
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My second hypothesis are those with higher levels of education completed, 
particularly those with a college degree, are more likely to support the Democratic 
Candidate, Hillary Clinton, as opposed to supporting the Republican Candidate, Donald 
Trump. 
My third hypothesis takes a closer look at the ‘most important issue’ facing the 
country today.  Voters who are more concerned about foreign affairs and immigration 
will more likely than not be supportive of Donald Trump and show lower levels of 
political distrust in his regard.  I suspect that the focus of this year’s election will be 
based around immigration and the economy, first and foremost.  This same group of 
voters will also exhibit much higher levels of political distrust towards Hillary Clinton.  
Voters who are most concerned about domestic social issues (i.e. equal pay for women, 
police and community relations) are more likely to not only support Hillary Clinton, but 
also show high levels of political trust towards her.  I suspect this group to also show 
overwhelming distrust levels for Donald Trump.   
With regards to political ideology, those who align more with left-winged politics 
will support Hillary Clinton in an overwhelming fashion when compared to Donald 
Trump.  The same goes for the political trust levels being higher for Hillary Clinton and 
lower for Donald Trump.  Voters who align more with right-winged politics will support 
Donald Trump more than Hillary Clinton, but not in an overwhelming fashion.  I suspect 
that many self-identifying conservatives are more willing to back Independent Candidate 
Gary Johnson based on the lower political trust levels from conservatives in their views 
of Donald Trump.  This obviously creates an advantage in theory for Hillary Clinton 
(earning more of the political trust within her own ideological base) when compared to 
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opposing candidate Donald Trump earning the trust within those who identify as 
conservatives.  This variable alone could prove to be detrimental in determining the next 
president since a significant portion of conservatives will seek an ‘alternative option’ in 
selecting a presidential candidate. 
Moderate voters, otherwise known as independents, may once again decide the 
outcome of this next election.  I suspect those with middle-of-the-road ideologies will 
support Independent Candidate, Gary Johnson, if political distrust levels are high.  This 
would hurt Donald Trump in the election more so than Hillary Clinton since there is a 
majority within the populous that shifting towards liberalism.  If political distrust levels 
are low amongst those who are moderate in ideology, these voters will be more inclined 
to vote for Hillary Clinton.  Since traditional party politics do not have as much 
partisanship pull on moderates, as compared to Democrats and Republicans, independent 
voters will better be able to remove subjective party biases and make a rational decision 
based on the experience and leadership qualities of each candidate as their form of 
rational reasoning.  This would further create an advantage for Hillary Clinton. 
My fifth and final hypothesis looks at age.  In recent years, President Barack 
Obama was able to mobilize not only minorities and blue-collared, middle-classed 
workers, but also younger voters and those who are students in college.  I expect this 
group to play another significant role in the upcoming 2016 General Election.  I suspect 
that first-time voters, those within the millennials generation, to vote Democrat at a much 
higher propensity than Republican.  As such, creating an advantage for Hillary Clinton, 
she will be able to enjoy an overwhelming statistically significant support percentage 
from those who are younger in age, still in college, and potentially younger professionals.   
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For those who are older in age, I expect much more support to align with the 
Republican Party.  More often than not, those sixty-five years of age and older, identify 
with the Republican Party more than the Democratic Party.  This group of individuals are 
also much more inclined to vote than those of younger generations due to the daily 
schedule of the younger populous (i.e. school, work).  But, the proportions in which this 
age group once dominated voter-turnout has been closing in more recent years due to the 
mobilization efforts of Democrats mentioned above.   
Since there is no absolute, definite answer to political times, I must address 
potential concerns with the model setup.  From decade to decade, political times 
undoubtedly vary based on the conditions, policies, and beliefs of the populous here and 
far between.  In noting this, it becomes subjective if one relies too heavily on assumption 
rather than the factual beliefs of statistics and data provided.  Taking this into account, I 
will interpret the data ‘as is,’ while attempting to draw comparisons across the time-series 
analysis.   
Data accumulation itself can become bias-leaning and skewed based on the 
plethora of outlets that provide political information on daily basis.  For this reason, I rely 
more heavily on independent research provided by the American National Election 
Studies and by world renounced statistician, Nate Silver (via 538 blog).  This is with 
hopes of keeping a complete bipartisan look on data, interpretations, and implications for 
future scholarly research.  Accounting for these potential concerns should help, more 
likely than not, throughout the entire research process and the subsequent building upon 
this research in future studies.  Once again, the goal is to derive information that is 
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accurate, non-subjective (as much as possible), and to provide indicators for decision-
makers in years beyond now.    




DATA AND RESULTS 
The fluctuations throughout previous decades can be better explained by taking a 
look at figure 3.1 which breaks down political trust.  In the latter portion of the 1950’s, 
political trust was higher than any other decade we have seen in recent times.  The first 
decline may have had a relation to the assassination of then President John F. Kennedy 
during his first term in office [November 1963].  There remained a continuation of this 
decline thru the LBJ Presidency and obviously the Nixon Presidency with heightened 
media coverage unfolding the Watergate Scandal logistics.     
 
Figure 3.1 Trust in Federal Government 
Source:  (ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior 2015) 
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People did not respond well to trusting the federal government again until the 
defeat of Incumbent President Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan [R] in the 1980 
Presidential Election.  More likely than not, the Iran Hostage Crisis played a significant 
role in the defeat Carter endured.  The lack of his administration to resolve the underlying 
issues overseas did not bode well with the populous in America.  Reagan’s years in office 
had leveled out political trust percentages around 50%.  Another sharp decline took place 
shortly after when President George H.W. Bush made the decision to compromise with a 
Democratic controlled Congress in the 1990 budget agreement.  This was subsequent to 
his promise of “no new taxes” at the 1988 Republican National Convention.  Trust hit an 
all-time low in 1994, when Republicans gained control of both chambers of Congress for 
the first time in forty years. 
A growing economy during the Clinton [D] years in office began the upward 
climb of political trust.  Despite his involvement with an intern, President Clinton still 
provided America with a sense of once again trusting the federal government [an outlier 
of sorts].  Undoubtedly, President George W. Bush’s ability to unify the country in 
response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 provided the populous with a sense of unity, trust 
in federal government, and a more willing attitude to sacrifice certain civil liberties to 
ensure a safe environment.  Like any prolonged international crisis, these can quickly 
create a turn in an adverse direction.  It most certainly did as the involvement in 
Afghanistan rolled over into Iraq.   
Not finding any weapons of mass destruction, coupled with an economy that was 
beginning to suffer, proved to show one of the more unique paradigm shifts of political 
trust in any administration.  By the time President Barack Obama took office, the Great 
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Recession was underway and Americans had already showed their emphatic distrust in 
the federal government once again.  One can see where political trust has once again 
dipped to lower levels at or around 20% with regards to the federal government. 
As expected from the first hypothesis, those with a party identification of 
Democrat are more likely than Republicans to support their own candidate running for 
president.  One can clearly see in figure 3.2 that Clinton is obtaining 91% of her own 
party’s identifiers while Trump is only obtaining 85% of his party’s identifiers.  Also, it 
is important to point out that Clinton is obtaining a 3% ‘party swing vote’ advantage over 
Trump.  By party swing vote, I mean, those who are in support of a candidate from the 





Figure 3.2 Differences (Demographics) in support for Trump and Clinton 
Source:  (Voter General Election Preferences 2016) 
 One can also see that education levels in figure 3.2 provide an interesting dynamic 
in the 2016 presidential election race, too.  Once again, as expected, those with higher 
education levels are more likely to support Clinton over Trump.  Synonymous with the 
second hypothesis, the higher the education level one obtains is also a growing portion of 
support in the direction of Clinton.  Even individuals with lesser amounts of education, 
‘some college’ and ‘high school diploma or less,’ show stronger support for Clinton than 
Trump.  The percentages are undoubtedly closer in the lower levels of education - 
particularly those who have ‘some college’ education [47% Clinton to 46% Trump]. 
 Age may very well be an interesting dynamic in this election.  Much more 
emphasis has been placed on new millennial voters and their mobilization efforts to get 
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out and vote.  Table 3.1 provides a more detailed, in-depth breakdown of the age dynamic 
with comparisons in trends from the previous two presidential elections.  One can see 
where younger voters [those 18-29 years of age] are more inclined to vote for Clinton 
than Trump by a 60% to 30% margin.  Surely the margins could be tightened for those 
who are undecided or do not know who they will be voting for at this given time.  But, 
even if Trump were to obtain that portion of voters, he would still be at a -20% margin 
differential.   
 Continuing with the age dynamic, as expected, those of sixty-five years of age or 
older are more inclined to vote for Trump as opposed to Clinton.  But, an overwhelming 
majority is not prevalent here.  Going against hypothesized expectations, those of 65+ 
years of age are not creating a more clear-cut advantage for Trump as opposed to the 
young millennial voters creating an advantage for Clinton.  One can see that voters 65+ 
years of age only favor Trump over Clinton by 49% to 46% with 5% being undecided, 
respectively.  Romney and McCain were both able to obtain at least a 7% margin 
differential in their favor with regards to the 65+ year old vote during the previous two 




Table 3.1 Vote Preferences in June 2008, 2012, and 2016  
 
Source:  (Voter General Election Preferences 2016) 
 Those in the age range of 30-49 were more inclined to support Obama as opposed 
to McCain and Romney in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections.  The same goes for 
their support towards Hillary Clinton in modern 2016 presidential election percentages.  
One can tell that as age levels rose, so did the likelihood of supporting a Republican 
Candidate.  There’s a shift that begins to take place from the age range of 30-49 and the 
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age range of 50-64 that starts to build momentum for Republican candidates.  This 
dynamic illustrates the need for Republicans to not only obtain a majority of these voters, 
but also do it in overwhelming fashion.  If this does not take place, more likely than not, 
Republicans will continue to lose presidential elections in years to come for not obtaining 
this statistically significant percentage.   
 Another interesting dynamic is where the populous tends to believe federal 
government should focus attention.  There are a plethora of issues that face the country 
on a day-to-day basis all while new issues arise.  Some issues prove to be more consistent 
than others throughout history.  Confirming the hypothesis pertaining to most important 
issue facing the country, a recent Gallup poll shows the two most prevalent issues 
Americans feel need to be addressed are ‘the economy’ and ‘immigration.’  Table 3.2 
further extrapolates on the percentage breakdown by showing the economy obtaining 
nearly one-fifth of the attention – right at 19% overall.   
A close second to the economy, immigration, obtained 14% of the attention 
within the populous.  Surprisingly, earning wages, decline of the middle-class, and 
terrorism were not overwhelming issues that many Americans felt needed to be addressed 




Table 3.2 Most significant single issue president needs to address 
 Mentioning 
 % 
The economy 19 
Immigration 14 
Healthcare/Healthcare costs/Healthcare reform 10 
Defense/National Defense/Homeland security 9 
Education 8 
The federal deficit/The budget 7 
Wages/Earning a decent wage/Decline of middle class 6 
Jobs/Unemployment 6 
Terrorism 5 
May 18-22, 2016 
G ALLUP  
Regardless of who wins the election, what single issue or challenge are you most 




The economy 19 
Immigration 14 
Healthcare/Healthcare costs/Healthcare reform 10 
Defense/National Defense/Homeland security 9 
Education 8 
The federal deficit/The budget 7 





Table 3.2 (Continued) 
Terrorism 5 
May 18-22, 2016 
GALLUP 
Source:  (Presidential Election 2016: Key Indicators 2016) 
 
 If more Americans continue to vote with their wallets as opposed to other 
avenues, this could prove to give Trump a bit of a boost from the populous.  His 
unethical, business-like approach has surely stimulated an interest in those who are more 
likely than not passionate about securing the southern border of the country from illegal 
immigrants and boosting our economy to more prosperous levels.  It’s well worth 
mentioning and noticeably significant to point out that despite ‘the economy’ being at the 
forefront of issues facing the country, ‘the federal deficit’ only pulled in 7% of mentions 
from the populous.  This could potentially be a shortcoming if individuals have the 
inclination of believing the federal deficit will have no direct or indirect bearing on their 
savings for the future.  It’s difficult to directly point out the preferred choice of 
presidential candidate amongst the different issue variables.  But, one can infer in which 
direction the populous would be more inclined to vote based on the statistical percentages 
provided, and the policy propositions dealing with each presidential candidate.   
 Perhaps political ideology is a demographic that deserves more attention in 
illustration of recent political climates throughout the entire country.  As we know, party 
polarization has grown immensely and can be further illustrated below in Figures 3.3, 3.4 




Figure 3.3 U.S. Political Ideology, recent trend amongst Democrats 
Source:  (Saad 2016) 
 
Since the year 2000, moderate ideologies amongst Democrats have taken the back 
seat to liberal ideologies.  Moderate ideologies amongst Democrats have dropped roughly 
9% during the fifteen year span.  The liberal momentum rise amongst Democrats 
occurred in the latter portion of the Bush Administration and only continued to grow 
during the first and second terms of the Obama Administration.  One can see where 
liberal ideologies amongst Democrats now make up roughly 45% of the party as 
compared to the moderate 35%.  This is not to overshadow the subsequent result it has on 
conservatives amongst Democrats.  The drop here over a fifteen year span went from one 
out of every four Democrats being ideologically conservative to now only accounting for 
17% of the Democratic base. 
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 The Republicans have similar results that show the significance of growing 
polarization within the base as well.  Figure 3.4 shows a statistically significant 
percentage rise in conservative ideologies.  
 
Figure 3.4 U.S. Political Ideology, recent trend amongst Republicans 
Source:  (Saad 2016) 
 
Even though the moderate ideologies amongst Republicans have only dropped 6% 
as opposed to the Democrats dropping 9%, this is still relevant.  For obvious reasons, the 
growing gap between pivots in politics continues to separate rather than unite.  For the 
most part, those within the Republican Party have remained more homogeneous in terms 
of their ideological breakdown.  This is better understood by simply looking at the liberal 
ideological identifiers amongst Republicans over a fifteen year span – which remains at 
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6%.  Conservative ideologies were more prevalent during the Obama Administration as 
compared to the Bush Administration. 
 
Figure 3.5 U.S. Political Ideology, recent trend amongst Independents 
Source:  (Saad 2016) 
 
 The moderate vote amongst Independents has dropped a few percentage points 
over a fifteen year span.  Once at 44% back in 2000, those amongst Independents now 
identifying as moderate only make up 41% of the independent base.  To provide a better 
understanding of what this means, we can take a look at the conservative and liberal 
growth in terms of ideology in this base.  Conservatives enjoy a 3% advantage in growth 
over a fifteen year span for those amongst Independents, but a 10% overall differential by 
2015.  This is significant because more likely than not conservatives will back 
Republican candidates as opposed to Democratic candidates running for the presidency.   
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Similar parallel logic indicates that liberals are more likely to back Democratic 
candidates running for president as opposed to Republican candidates.  Moderates create 
a curveball effect in elections, year in, year out.  This is where the majority of 
campaigning focuses on deriving the most out of their efforts.  Typically, as illustrated in 
the figures above, Republicans are going to back Republicans, and Democrats are going 
to back Democrats.  The battle is over the moderate voters, those who may have the 
ability to be swayed in one direction or the other, those who have not made up their 
minds and are ‘undecided’ voters.  These findings provide one with a better 
understanding of the propensities that lead individuals to a preferred presidential vote 
selection.   
Historically speaking, Clinton and Trump are two of the most disliked candidates 
we have seen in quite some time [potentially overall].  Figures 3.6 and 3.7 provide a 
time-series analysis of unfavorable ratings and net strong favorable ratings with regards 
to current and previous presidential nominees.  One would be quick to point out that 
Trump has eclipsed the 50% threshold of being disliked by the populous, but Hillary 
Clinton is still right under 40% which leads one to believe she’s not doing herself any 
favors.  Disregarding the current standings of disliked percentages amongst the 2016 
candidates, interesting enough, many previous presidential nominees were able to 
overcome higher ‘disliked’ percentages on their way to the White House.  George H.W. 
Bush in the 1992 Presidential Election, and Al Gore in the 2000 Presidential Election, are 





Figure 3.6 Clinton and Trump, historically disliked 
Source:  (Enten 2016) 
 
 A couple potential shortcomings should be pointed out from this figure.  First, the 
data accumulation was obtained from late March to late April of each election year.  But, 
there are many things that can happen over the course of a few month to shift public 
opinion polls in one direction or the other.  One must remember that the election does not 
take place until the first Tuesday, after the first Monday, in November.   
Secondly, from the sample within the population, one can only theorize to an 
extent the likelihood of those who will actually show up to the polls and vote.  For 
example, if voter turnout is high, there is much more of a chance for proportional 
representation, and we would be better able to accept the data if voters from both sides 
reflect the actual views of the populous.  But, if voter turnout is low, one may be led to 
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put more weight into data that may or may not be reflective of the actual populous 
feelings of those going to the polls and voting.  Put more specifically, ‘disliked’ 
percentages can certainly hurt a candidate, but only if those who are opposed to a 
candidate actually mobilize and vote will this be a problem.  Otherwise, there would be 
less relevance in disliked percentages despite a candidate not having the intention of 
creating a less than liked image.  
1  
Figure 3.7 Clinton and Trump, favorability ratings 
Source:  (Enten 2016) 
 
 
                                                 
1 These values are % strongly favorable minus % strongly unfavorable.  
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 Even favorable ratings have portrayed Clinton and Trump to be much less over 
the past 36 years in comparison to other presidential nominees.  As suggested by Harry 
Enten, party polarization does not count for the absolute reasoning behind lower 
favorable statistic percentages.  The populous is more likely unsatisfied with not only the 
two candidates, but their often controversial statements with regards to the opposition or 
their methods of campaigning.  Figure 3.7 goes on by further illustrating the importance 
of having highly favorable momentum going forward towards the election as opposed to 
being ‘disliked.’ 
 It sounds counterintuitive, but one can be ‘disliked’ and still be highly favorable 
in terms of preferred candidate running for president.  We have seen this in previous 
years with Ronald Regan [R] in 1984 being disliked more than Walter Mondale [D], but 
still holding onto a more highly favorable image during the same late March to late April 
study.  This also holds true in 1996 with Bill Clinton [D] being more disliked than Bob 
Dole [R], but retaining a more highly favorable image.  George W. Bush [R] was also 
more disliked than his rival John Kerry [D] in 2004, albeit able to obtain a more highly 
favorable rating.  The same can be said for Barack Obama [D] in 2008 as compared to 
John McCain [R] and subsequently in 2012 as compared to Mitt Romney [R].  All of the 
above nominees [presidents] who were able to counter being disliked by having an 
intense core of people rating them more highly favorable than their opponent went on to 
winning the general election in November later that particular year.  In this year’s 
election, it remains yet to be seen if Donald Trump is able to overcome being more 
disliked and viewed as less favorable than his rival, Hillary Clinton, by obtaining a 




CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 This study proposes intuition on how presidential politics in the future must take 
into account the trust levels within the populous.  Among Democrats age 40 and older 
who are likely voters, 32% prefer someone other than Clinton as the nominee, while 60% 
of young Democrats also favor a different nominee.  Election Day will provide scholars 
with a more theoretical context of what voters felt based on the outcome in different 
states throughout the country.  At least one thing is for certain; both candidates have been 
viewed as untrustworthy of sorts.  The untrustworthiness of both candidates have hurt 
both camps, Democratic and Republican. 
Table 4.1 Pleased with Clinton as Democratic Presidential Nominee, by age, 
Democratic leaning ID 
Pleased With Hillary Clinton as Democratic Presidential Nominee, by Age 
Among Democrats/leaners 
 
 Pleased Clinton is the nominee Wish someone else were the nominee 
 % % 
18 to 39 38 60 
40+ 67 32 
GALLU P,  AUG.  15 - 16 ,  2 016  
Source:  (Newport 2016) 
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 Older voters are more likely to vote than those of younger generations.  But, 
discounting the importance of young voters supporting Clinton could prove to become a 
shortcoming.  There is a high portion of individuals within Democratic leaning party 
identifiers that wish someone else aside from Clinton was the party’s nominee for 
president.  Those 40+ years of age, which are more likely to vote, make up 32% of 
individuals with a Democratic Party leaning ID that wish someone aside from Clinton 
was the nominee.  A potential lack of trust from the nomination process more likely than 
not stirred up animosity when then rival, Bernie Sanders was able to gain an immense 
amount of momentum (especially with young millennial voters in the populous).  Clinton 
will need to overcome these unbalanced percentages within her own party to also 
subsequently increase her chances at the presidency in November.   
Table 4.2 Pleased with Donald Trump as Republican Presidential Nominee, 
Republican leaning ID 
Now thinking about the candidates for president this year, are you pleased that 




Pleased Trump is the nominee 46 
Wish someone else were the nominee 52 
Don't know/Refused 3 
GALLU P,  AUG.  15 - 16 ,  2 016  




 In comparison to Hillary Clinton obtaining support from within her own 
Democratic base, Donald Trump has not fared so well in his Republican base, either.  To 
no surprise, only 46% of Republican leaning identifiers are pleased with Trump as the 
party nominee.  One can see that only 3% ‘did not know’ or ‘refused’ to answer the 
question.  This means that a plurality of Republicans wishes their party’s nominee were 
someone else.  Trump’s ability to earn the trust of his fellow Republicans, and ultimately, 
those within populous could prove to be the deciding factor in whether he stands a chance 
in obtaining the 270 mark of Electoral Votes this November. 
 In seeking to correlate data to a general election outcome in November, Clinton 
will place an emphasis on voter turnout and mobilization efforts.  Looking at figure 4.1 
demonstrates how more American’s identify as conservative (compared to being liberal).  
Of course, much importance will be placed on pulling the moderate vote away from 
Third-Party Candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein.  Over the course of twenty-three 




Figure 4.1 U.S. Political Ideology, Americans’ self-identified ideology 
Source:  (Saad 2016) 
 
 Moderate ideologies, once making up a majority in 1992 with 43% of self-
identified Americans, is now a close second to recently conservative ideologies (37%).  
The importance to note here is not only the statistical drop in moderate and conservative 
ideologies, but the net growth in liberal ideologies (from 17% in 1992 to 24% in 2015).  
Liberalism in America is growing, but the significance this will have on actual voter 
turnout and the presidential election is yet to be seen.  Never the less, if Clinton is able to 
mirror the mobilization efforts of Barack Obama in 2008, she will increase her chances of 
retaining the White House for Democrats.  But, if voter turnout does not increase in 
comparison to previous open-seat presidential elections, this could prove to be significant 
in the event Donald Trump wins the presidency.   
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 The same can be said if voter turnout is low amongst Trump supporters, too.  It all 
depends on if there is a rise from the 2012 statistics pertaining to general election votes 
and who actually shows up to the polls amongst the different demographic groups.  Both 
campaigns (much similar to recent presidential elections), have a strategy of operating by 
means of attack, or not campaigning solely on the issues.  Table 4.3 provides a better 
extrapolation on recent data pertaining to voter turnout in presidential elections.  There 
has been a constant rise in presidential voting percentages amongst the voting age 
population since 1996 with the exception of the last presidential election in 2012.  One 
can see that open-seat elections are of the utmost significance in voter turnout by showing 
a +9 million average in total votes (from re-election in ’96 to open-seat in ’00 and re-
election in ’04 to open-seat in ’08).  The results of the 2016 presidential votes and 
percentage of voting age population will provide much more direction as to what the 
country desired.   
 I expect that a higher participation amongst the voting age population, coupled 
with the total of votes will benefit Democrats and Independents more so than 
Republicans.  The reasoning behind this would be a mobilization of millennials, 
minorities, and other first-time voters to participate in this year’s election.  Higher 
distrust and satisfaction with both Clinton [D] and Trump [R] has been beneficial towards 
third-party candidates, but not increase in terms of actual polling percentages that would 
statistically give a chance of obtaining the presidency.  But, the longer Gary Johnson and 
Jill Stein remain in the race will hurt Clinton’s numbers more so than those of Trump by 
pulling away more libertarian leaning voters.  Whoever has supported Trump from the 
beginning is more likely to be supportive up to Election Day.  The same holds true for 
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Clinton.  Moderates and independents that are dissatisfied and view the two prominent 
candidates as distrustful could swing the 2016 election in favor of Democrats or 
Republicans (along with the future of public policy through the Supreme Court 
Appointments). 
Table 4.3 Number of votes cast in recent U.S. Presidential Elections 
Number of Votes Cast in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections 
 
 Total vote Turnout 
 (millions) (% of voting age population) 
1996 (re-election) 96 49.0 
2000 (open-seat) 105 51.2 
Change (pct. pts.) +9 -- 
2004 (re-election) 122 56.7 
2008 (open-seat) 131 58.2 
Change (pct. pts.) +9 -- 
2012 (re-election) 129 54.9 
2016 (open-seat) NA NA 
Change (pct. pts.) NA NA 
THE AMERI C AN PR ESI D ENCY PROJ EC T VOT ER TURNOUT DA TA  
Source:  (Tarrance 2016) 
 
 Table 4.4 provides a clear view of how liberals, conservatives, and moderates are 
leaning in this year’s presidential election.  As originally hypothesized, one can see that 
liberals are backing the Democratic Nominee, Hillary Clinton, at a higher percentage than 
conservatives backing Republican Nominee, Donald Trump.  Clinton is pulling in 
roughly 73% of the liberal ideology vote with only 12% of this ideology going towards 
Trump.  Meanwhile, with regards to conservatives, Donald Trump is only pulling in 68% 
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of the vote with up to 17% going towards Clinton.  From just the two ideological 
standpoints, this clearly indicates an advantage for Clinton not just amongst her own 
party’s general base, but also another advantage in pulling away some portion of 
conservative votes from Trump’s base. 
Table 4.4 Presidential Vote Choice %’s by Ideology  
 BY IDEOLOGY 
Liberals 
73% Clinton 






68% Trump 2 
Source:  (Alcantara, Uhrmacher and Guskin 2016) 
 
 Moderates, by ideological preference in the presidential vote, also confirm the 
latter portion of this hypothesis by backing Clinton over Trump in statistical percentages.  
Clinton is showing a 45% to 36% advantage with those of a moderate ideology which 
creates a tall wall to climb for Donald Trump to overcome in seeking the presidency.  
Surely, something will have to change sooner than later for statistical percentages to 
swing not only in his favor, but away from Clinton to ensure a true net gain in votes.  
Undoubtedly, the populous is favoring Clinton over Trump in liberal and moderate 
                                                 
2 Percentages are based on a four-way vote choice (Gary Johnson and Jill Stein) among registered voters. 
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ideologies, and even potentially amongst some conservatives whom may be seeking an 
alternative option rather than their own party’s nominee.   
 The most important issue(s) facing the country, coupled with the preferences of 
the populous show interesting results in who is more preferred to handle each task, 
Clinton or Trump.  As shown in Table 4.5, more of the populous is leaning towards 
Democratic nominee, Clinton, to handle the everyday job of the presidency based on the 
plethora of issues within the United States.  It is also important to note the discrepancies 
within the statistical percentages in each categorical issue.  On liberal issues, Clinton is 
expected to carry a significant advantage in percentage of preference, which she certainly 
has illustrated in this table.  But, surprisingly, Trump has not carried a significant 
advantage in percentage of preference on conservative issues.   
 Clinton shows advantages in categorical issues as high as +35 in percentage 
points (treatment of minority groups within the country), while Trump only shows an 
advantage as high as +9 in percentage points (the federal budget deficit, and government 
regulation of Wall Street and banks).  Arguably the most interesting dynamic of this table 
is brought to light by focusing on the economy – once again the most important issue 
facing the country in data accumulation provided by the populous during the 2016 
presidential election season.  Considering the professional background Trump has in 
higher levels of economic prosperity and business, one would be inclined to believe that 
his advantage within this issue (in terms of percentage points) would be much higher than 
it shows – at only +3 in percentage points.  Immigration, the second most important issue 
facing the country based on 2016 presidential election data accumulation, shows that 
Clinton has obtained a favorable +13 percentage point advantage over her opponent.  
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This suggests that based on the two most important issues facing the country, Clinton is 
preferred by at least +10 percentage points amongst those within the populous.       
Table 4.5 Voter’s perceptions of candidate best able to handle issues 
Registered Voters' Perceptions of Which Candidate Is Best Able to Handle Key 
Issues 
Regardless of which presidential candidate you support, please tell me if you think Hillary 
Clinton or Donald Trump would better handle each of the following issues. 
 





 % % pct. pts. 
The treatment of minority groups 
in this country 
65 30 Clinton +35 
Climate change 62 29 Clinton +33 
Social issues such as gay 
marriage and abortion 
63 33 Clinton +30 
Foreign affairs 61 35 Clinton +26 
Education 61 36 Clinton +25 
Healthcare and the Affordable 
Care Act 
56 41 Clinton +15 
Immigration 55 42 Clinton +13 
The distribution of income and 
wealth in the U.S. 
50 44 Clinton +6 
Trade with other nations 51 47 Clinton +4 
Terrorism and national security 48 47 Clinton +1 
The federal budget deficit 44 53 Trump +9 
Government regulation of Wall 
Street and banks 
43 52 Trump +9 
The size and efficiency of the 
federal government 




Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Gun policy 45 52 Trump +7 
Taxes 45 51 Trump +6 
Employment and jobs 47 51 Trump +4 
The economy 47 50 Trump +3 
GALLU P,  SEPT.  14 - 18 ,  2 016  
Source:  (Auter 2016) 
 
 These percentages could further provide implications that Trump is at a 
significant deficit in terms of obtaining the votes needed for the presidency.  When 
looking at table 4.5 as a whole, the populous has clearly provided the notion that despite 
the scandals, and constant controversial missteps with campaigning, Clinton is still 
trusted to run the country better than businessman, Trump.  He will more likely than not 
lose the presidency based on the inability to unify his own party, create a favorable image 
of himself, and capitalize on conservative principles in overwhelming statistical 
proportions.  Both of the candidates are historically disliked and distrusted.  Clinton and 
Trump are also not preferred by many ideologically moderate voters (let alone voters 
within their own party bases, Democratic and Republican).  Despite the historically low 
levels of political trust in the country, there will still be a president elected from the major 
two-party system in the United States.  All indicators at this point show that Hillary 
Clinton will be the first woman president of the United States in our nation’s history.  
Nevertheless, the political landscape and climates throughout the country are changing 
and traditional politics are coming to an end.    
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  Potential shortcomings of this study may include the emphasis placed on 
dissatisfaction and favorable ratings amongst the candidates.  On so many different 
occasions, events (i.e. presidential debates) can play a significant role in the decisions of 
the electorate for which one is unable to truly account for until Election Day statistics 
begin to develop.  By looking at polling data, one must be aware of the dates leading up 
to the election.  Methodology surely varies from institution, and it’s also debatable 
whether or not to place more significance on state polling averages, or national poll 
averages.  Those individuals participating in survey data may be more likely to 
participate in general elections, but there is no guarantee in this regard.  Too often than 
not, one has the tendency to answer questions based on what he or she feels is the 
‘correct’ answer without actually being truthful.  This is something that can negatively 
skew data and lower confidence intervals immensely. 
 Future research should focus on the results of this upcoming 2016 Presidential 
Election and better combat against the limitations of data accumulation from the 
electorate.  A forecast may be more essential and significant when comparing issues 
across a city to rural area populous on a state and national perspective.  Also, more 
personable and qualitative data may provide a more accurate sense of the electorate as 
opposed to quantitative data.  Surely, these are great tools for measurement but there is 
never an absolute until the results from Election Day are provided to us all.  From here, 
theoretical explanations and practical implications are sure to remain debatable amongst 
scholars.  Overall, the masses within the electorate are demanding changes that illustrate 
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Political Trust Index Questions 
"People have (1958,1964: I'd like to talk about some of the) different  
ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don't refer  
to democrats or republicans in particular, but just to government in  
general. We want to see how you feel about these ideas.” 
 
 VCF0604: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government  
in Washington to do what is right-- just about always, most of the  
time or only some of the time?"  
VCF0605: "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big  
interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the  
benefit of all the people?"  
VCF0606: "Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money  
we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?"  
V608: "Do you think that quite a few of the people running the  
government are (1958-1972: a little) crooked, not very many are, or do  
you think hardly any of them are crooked (1958-1972: at all)?"  
 
Source:  The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). The ANES 
Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor].  
 
